Notes on the Front

Commentary on Irish Political Economy by Michael Taft, researcher for SIPTU

October 28th Lunchtime: The Recession Diaries

Recession 79 The fiscal meltdown is the result of our economic decline, not the cause.  It seems straight-forward enough, but let's put it another way:  our fiscal imbalance is a symptom of our economic malady, not the malady itself.  The reason why it's necessary to continually repeat this is because the general political and media consensus is that we have to make sacrifices to restore our public finances.  Unemployment is going up, investment and consumption are collapsing, output is falling, credit is becoming scarcer – but the Right want us to believe the real problem is that our books are not properly balanced.  Are they really suggesting that our economic decline is due to the growing deficit?  Its as if the house is on fire and everyone is arguing about the colour of the carpets.

Recessions have a multitude of causes but one defining characteristic:  lack of money.  People don't have money to spend, businesses don't have money to operate, investors don't have money to invest, banks don't have money to lend – and so on.  What you don't do in a recession, therefore, is withdraw money.  Fianna Fail has committed many sins – taking away medical cards, levying low incomes, cutting education; but a modern-day Socrates might point out that these are aspects of the 'sin' but not the sin itself.  The sin is to take out money from the economy – through public expenditure cuts and increasing taxes. 

This is the ground on which the Left can distinguish itself from Fianna Fail.  We're beating around the edges – opposing this or that cut, arguing for this or that alternative income stream; the real difference is that the Left wants (or should want) to reflate the economy, put money back in, create more activity. 

But that doesn't mean we should ignore the fiscal issues.  To define them properly, the Left and trade unionists have to get a handle on it – and be seen to have a handle on it.  So let's get this debt and borrowing thing into some perspective, especially as the Right raises the spectre of a return to the bad ol' debt days of the 1980s.

First, the issue is not so much debt as debt repayments.  If your debt is high but your repayments low, the issue becomes less acute (conversely, if your debt is low but repayments high – situations that many low-income households face with loan sharks, etc.).  So what are our debt repayment levels?

In 2008, our net debt service was 1.5 percent of GNP.  In 1987 (when our overall debt was the highest in relation to our GNP) the debt service was 9.5 percent of GNP.  We could treble our borrowing levels and not get anywhere near that level.  So let's not lose our heads over this – as the headless Right are doing.

What if our debt service provision quadrupled (this would imply a huge amount of money to spend in the economy via borrowing)?  We'd be back at the 1997 level – when we were two years into the Celtic Tiger boom and Charlie McCreevy was taking an axe to every tax he could find in the fiscal forest. 

So the question is – what's the problem?  Of course, these are figures based on current debt service.  They don't take into account shifts in borrowing costs (which are falling), nor do they take account of the higher borrowing cost associated with that wonderful guarantee which is doing such a great job of saving our banks' share value. 

Nor would I try now to project these figures over the next two/three years for the simple reason that the Government projections for tax revenue are dodgy to say the least.  Whereas the Government projects that the Exchequer balance will be (-) €13.4 billion next year, Davy puts the figure at (-) €18.6 billion. While Goodbody's figures are not as pessimistic as Davy's, they still project a worse balance than the Government.  The fact is that no one trusts the Government numbers.  

My only point here is that we shouldn't allow the Right to dictate the terms of this debate.  These are the same people who insisted that we should cut, cut, cut taxes to the point now that we don't have enough revenue coming in.  Now they're going to lecture us on borrowing? 

Of course, we can't be blase about borrowing.  We don't want it to spiral out of control.  To buttress public finances I have suggested a Donald Trump-like once-off tax on capital assets.  Here's another suggestion to keep our finances under control.

The state provides income supports and benefits to those out of work, which are withdrawn once they get a job – on the grounds that once in work, you don't need them.  Jobseeker's Benefit/Allowance is one such support.  So let's treat tax reliefs the same way – such reliefs should be given to households which need the support, but once you get over a certain income level, they should be withdrawn. 

For instance, why should individuals on more than €100,000 get medical insurance relief?  Why should the rest of us subsidise something they surely can afford?  Or mortgage interest relief?  The Department of Environment shows that 45 percent of all borrowers have incomes of over €80,000.  Of course, this figure can combine the income of two spouses/partners, but within that category there are individuals earning over €100,000 who are getting a relief which we all have to pay for.

So – the Left's argument should be simple:  borrow, borrow, borrow.  Get money back into economy, increase Government activity which means more procurement for businesses, increase people's income supports, shore up public services, ensure that the rising tide of borrowing lifts the smallest boats first.  And defray some of this cost by slapping taxes on, and withdrawing relief from, those who can afford it. 

In that way, our opposition to education cuts and the income levy can be placed in a long-term strategic plan and not be seen as mere oppositionism without an alternative.

4 responses to “October 28th Lunchtime: The Recession Diaries”

  1. Graham Avatar

    Hi Michael, I’m sorry I can’t say that I agree with the goal to “reflate the economy, put money back in, create more activity.” After the misdirections of a credit and consumption boom, an economy needs to be rebalanced as people must start to save again and resources must be directed away from the previously inflated sectors. In the short term this necessitates a painful recession. It’s appropriate that there be a slowdown as the market adjusts to the new realities. The supply of credit should at the least stop rising quickly, and might even need to fall. Employment should exit the inflated sectors and re-enter the neglected sectors of the economy. Asset prices should fall dramatically and consumer spending should also collapse as people build up their real savings.
    The only types of things a government can do in this environment is to redistribute the losses and prolong the misdirection of resources which characterised the boom. Many governments in recession choose to do the worst the possible things (e.g. impose price controls or attempt to print enough money to bring back the boom) and thus cause massive destruction. But the problems were caused by huge economic misallocations, and only dramatic and painful market reallocations can fix them. Governments can’t possibly perform this function of reallocation, yet their political incentives are almost certainly going to be in favour of preventing it.

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  2. Michael Taft Avatar

    Graham, thanks for your comment; as always, clear and cogent. But, of course, you won’t be surprised that I, in turn, don’t go along with your analysis. Let’s take one aspect of the current recession: the financial crisis. This arose largely as a result of the deregulation of financial markets – by governments who went along with the neo-liberal tide in the 1980s/90s. This allowed a relatively handful of players to recklessly gamble unbelievable sums on ‘financial products’ that were flawed. Under a regulated regime, this could have been stopped. Government policy allowed this to happen, government policy can prevent this from happening in the future.
    In the meantime, why should competent and profitable enterprises suffer from the resulting credit squeeze? They are, as we all are, collateral damage inflicted by an unaccountable few. This raises not only questions of economy but of democracy as well.
    It also raises the issue of whether one allows the ‘market’ to rectify the financial mess. Would one really propose letting banks sink? The fall-out would be incredible and people who have acted in an economically responsible manner would be hit. This suggests a role for the state to protect the innocent from the economically guilty (just as in the neighbourhood).
    We could apply this same analysis to the Government’s ill-conceived stoking of the property market. Had a more rational policy been in place, we might be in a better position to ‘weather’ the current storm. Again, the debate is over the kind of Government action we need, not whether we need one at all.
    We all need a better understanding of how markets and market forces operate – and in this respect many of the points you raise should be taken on board by all of us. As you know, I have constantly exhorted the Left and trade unionists to take markets seriously. After all, the one group of people who most want companies to be successful are the emloyees – because this will enhance wages, working conditions and job security. Just as in life, there are certain ‘laws’, a certain logic in the way markets work. We ignore and defy them at our risk. To first learn the processes, helps us minimise the risk and increase the chance for success.
    However, I suppose where we might diverge, Graham, is not so much over the particulars of an expansionist approach; rather I suspect it might be that I see markets as something socially constructed. The rules, the parameters, the goals, and the bottom lines of market activity are defined by society – using the state as a tool to democratically determine how markets can serve the larger social need. But no matter how much we all diverge, it is important that we maintain a debate that can instruct us all. And in the process, who knows, we can from time to time steal good ideas from each other.

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  3. Graham Avatar

    Thanks for the most civilised reply, Michael.
    I guess that from my perspective there is no causal relationship that makes sense to me which could link “deregulation” with the business cycle. Empirically, I’m not even sure how much deregulation actually occurred (for example, Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in the US in 2002 which involved far greater regulation of accounting and other business practices).
    If the idea that regulation can cause a business cycle is explained to me in some kind of a logical economic framework then I will certainly accept it and see if it can be applied to what has happened recently but I am yet to be able to do that.
    It makes infinitely more sense to me that what really causes the business cycle are artificially low interest rates and booming credit supplies being injected into an economy. This can be exacerbated by other manifestations of government power, e.g. observe that FNME & FRE were sponsored by the US government and enjoyed implicit guarantees of being bailed out in a crisis, thus creating huge moral hazards.
    I notice that many people apparently believe that the existence of complex financial products is at fault here, e.g. the much-maligned mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives. But these products are designed expressly to manage risk, not to increase it. And it’s inevitable that sometimes people will miscalculate the value of these things and suffer losses as a result. The problem with the MBS was not really their complexity – the problem was that the underlying assets gradually became worthless, and also that favourable credit conditions had enticed large numbers of institutional investors to leverage up on them. If the mortgage-backed securities had been less complex the only difference would have been in the distribution of losses. As it happened, the losses were distributed such that those who had accepted greater risks in to their investments did indeed get crushed sooner. Everybody else got crushed too, but they would have done so even without the complexity of the products.
    While I would accept that government regulation could indeed shut down these markets to some extent and thus prevent the malinvestments from occurring, it doesn’t follow that we’d be any better off as a result. I don’t see how a government could possibly distinguish between malinvestments and genuinely strong investments. And shutting down a market would clearly result in even less economic calculation than takes place in a partially free, inflated market.
    As for rescuing banks and other firms from going out of business, I think that is going to cause far more terrible moral hazard than had occurred previously. Any sort of economic intuition would imply that allowing firms to play with taxpayers’ money is going to cause even more wasteful activity than had previously occurred. And whlie it’s true that the State could appoint its agents to the boards of those firms it props up from collapse, then we are clearly on the road to even more corporatism or socialism.
    Letting banks fail would be painful in the short run, but pain is inevitable after the destruction of a credit boom. A booming economy like we had in Ireland is simply unsustainable and there’s nothing anybody can do to keep it going. The unfortunate truth is that many firms probably should go out of business in this environment, at least temporarily. The painful adjustment to new conditions is what the economy needs to get back on the right road. It’s possible that many of the more extravagant business enterprises which sprung up during the boom years would not prosper in a productive economy. It’s important that the market figures out which ones should fail.
    The deflation of a credit crunch is unfortunate for some, but falling prices also benefits some. And those businesses which really are sound and can prosper in a sound economy will suffer with everyone else for the time being but that’s just another inevitable backlash of our phony economy.
    Anyway, thanks for letting me comment and I’ll talk to you again soon.

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  4. Michael Taft Avatar

    Graham, will get back to these points soon. I would have thought that deregulation was now accepted as a contributing factor to the current crisis but I’ll try to find a more detailed summary of this argument for you.
    Just a quick point – I certainly do agree with you on the issue of moral hazard. If this is not handled correctly, then the spectre of irresponsible behaviour being bailed out by the state could find an unwelcomed precedenct. That’s not an argument against bank bail-outs; but it is an argument for extreme caution. On the other points, as I said, I’ll get back to you.

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Commentary on Irish Political Economy by Michael Taft, researcher for SIPTU