Notes on the Front

Commentary on Irish Political Economy by Michael Taft, researcher for SIPTU

October 22nd Lunchtime: The Recession Diaries

Recession 76 Where stands the debate on the unusustainability of 'universalism' now?  The Government has stated that only 5% of over-70s have incomes exceeding €36,400 (€72,800 for a couple) and the cost of providing them a medical card would be €10 – €15 million.  Unsustainable?  It amounts to pennies.  In fact, it amounts to less than pennies because (a) there is a cost to not providing a medical card (e.g. drug repayment scheme, administration of means-test, etc.), and (b) the cost is gross, not net: doctors receive the payment and pay income tax on it.  So:  5% and minuscule cost; wasn't that a great little debate?

Other debates are rearing their collective heads.  Education cuts is one.  And the impact of the 1% levy.  P. O'Neill over at Irishelection.com points out the inequity of the levy's threshold:

' . . . if you make €17,540, your income levy is zero. If you make €17,541, your income levy is €175.40. Lesson: don’t work for that extra euro.'

It's called a 'step-effect' or an income trap: where an increase in gross income leads to a decrease in net income. In the case of the income levy that's because the threshold exempts people earning below €17,540 – not earnings below that amount. This is not an isolated phenomenon in our tax/levy/social welfare code.  In fact it's choc-a-block with these income traps.  Here's a sampling:

The 2 percent Health Levy:  if you earn €26,000 or below, you pay nil.  If you earn €26,001 you pay the 2 percent on the full amount (€520).  That's a big hit.

The PRSI Exemption Threshold:  if you earn €18,304 you are exempt from the 4 percent PRSI contribution.  Exceed that amount and you pay the levy on all income exceeding €6,604 (though this is phased in through in marginal relief, so the impact is not immediate).

Family Income Supplement:  The is a real killer.  It is linked to thresholds with payments equal to 60 percent of the difference between net income and the threshold.  Here's a crude example: a family on €24,000 with one child will get €900 per year.  However, if there income goes up €1,500 they will lost that entire amount. 

Rent Supplement:  Here's another stinger.  This is a complicated means-tested programme that primarily benefits those on social welfare (though in some circumstances part-time workers may be eligible).  In 2006, someone on unemployment assistance would receive €79 per week in Rent Supplement.  But: get a full-time job, even if on the minimum wage, and you lose the whole amount.

There are a plethora of benefits and income supports that are withdrawn as income rises – sometimes only marginally: medical card, back-to-work allowance, back-to-school allowance, etc.  This can create some bizarre situations whereby it is financially more rational to remain unemployed or part-time or working for less money.  So much for the vaunted 'incentive to work' that we get lectured about.

Let's take one small example:  a lone parent with one child working on the minimum wage (38 hours).  Just focussing the tax/levy aspect she would by paying no tax and no levies.  In addition, she would receive €97 a week in Family Income Supplement.  Her weekly income would be €425.

Let's say she gets a job offer – one that pays €26,500.  Understandably, she would be quite excited – after all, it's a 55 percent wage increase.  However, she starts wading through the bottom line.   Through tax credits, she won't be in the income tax net.  But:

  • She'll be liable for PRSI, Health and Income levy

  • More worrying, she'll lose the Family Income Supplement

With the new job, what's the take-home pay?  €479.  That's an increase of €54 per week.  So: she gets a gross wage increase of €180 per week but only keeps €54.  That's a marginal tax rate of 70 percent.  Paddy the speculator-plasterer, on six figures a year, only faces a marginal tax rate of 45.5 percent.

The one thing that comes through all this is that it's people on low incomes who are most affected by income and poverty traps.  For instance, the income levy rises to 2 percent on incomes over €100,000.  But unlike the threshold that operates at the low end (whereby all income below is levied), the 2 percent only applies to income in excess of €100,000.

That's equity the Fianna Fail-way.  That's incentivising work.  That's sharing the pain.  Makes one want to stand up in the bus and start singing Amhrán na bhFiann.

NOTE:  For an exhaustive study on poverty and income traps arising from the interaction of the tax and social welfare codes, go to 'Out of the Traps', written by the European Anti-Poverty Network and OPEN – the lone parent social organisation.  Though the numbers refer to 2005, the processes and operation remain the same.  Here's their follow-up on the 2006 Budget.

3 responses to “October 22nd Lunchtime: The Recession Diaries”

  1. Yvonne Avatar

    Michael, do you think it is perhaps ‘incentivising’ employers in certain sectors to keep wages low and patterns casual / part-time, well aware that there are many who will need to keep their earnings below means-test thresholds for the reasons you have shown?

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  2. James Avatar

    And of course this kind of irrationality is simply endemic in non-universal social programmes – it’s just very hard to design targeted, means-tested policies in a way that doesn’t produce such perverse incentives and poverty traps. I would add that contrary to the conventional analysis, where the measure of an egalitarian social policy is seen as how targeted it is on the poorest, the most egalitarian outcomes (viz the Nordic countries) is in countries whose social expenditure is the least redistributive per euro spent (Korpi and Palme’s “paradox of redistribution”). Thus, from an egalitarian viewpoint, the important thing is not to direct every penney spent towards the poor, but rather to spend an awful lot in the first place – to build a large, generous and universal welfare state.
    I wonder are you a fan of the idea of gradually converting most welfare state programmes into a single universal basic income, Michael? (Devil in the details obviously…)

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  3. Michael Taft Avatar

    Yvonne, I haven’t come across any data or papers to suggest that Irish employers keep wages low to facilitate their employees retention of means-tested programmes. That only 30% of those who are entitled to Family Income Supplement actually receive it suggests that most employees are not aware of either programmes that assist them (that’s the problem with means-tested programmes as oppposed to universal ones; Child Benefit has a take up rate of nearly 100%), or the impact of a complicated tax system has on their earnings. For the most part, employers don’t need any reason to keep wages low – they do it as a slash n’burn reflex. However, there are proceses which employers ‘avoid’ to ensure that wages are kept low. Refusing to negotiate collectiely with their employers. Study after study shows that when workers are unionised, they get a higher wage. Employers no like. However, I will take a look around and see if there are examples of where employers manipulate wages to take advantage of tax or levies.
    James, I have a lot of interest in Basic Income. It has, with the right application, the potential to end a considerable number of income traps for low-paid workers, in addition to supplementing their incomes, while at the same time buttressing a strong social insurance system. I’ve been researching for a post for some time on this – so I’ll hurry it up and get your thoughts on it.

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Commentary on Irish Political Economy by Michael Taft, researcher for SIPTU